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ABSTRACT

In August 1994, a Statement of Work (SOW) was issued for the design,
installation, and integration of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Commercial
Off The Shelf (COTS) technology on a U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS) aircraft.
The program was known as the Airborne Systems Training and Research Support
(ASTARS) Aircraft.
The proposed aircraft would train test pilot students throughout the globe on
airborne systems flight test techniques. The concept was initiated from a cancelled A-12
design bed and would be built on a P-3 Orion aircraft. In April 1995, the proposal to
build the ASTARS aircraft was accepted, resulting in a contract award to private
industry. In its first few years the new ASTARS program experienced terrific success.
More than 1,000 individuals from 19 different countries were trained using the ASTARS
system. The aircraft was an integral syllabus component for the world’s largest test pilot
schools.
Although an excellent training tool, the single ASTARS asset could not provide
continuous year-round training. Rising flight training demands along with a required
8-month maintenance phase amplified the need for a second ASTARS aircraft. In 2001,
the acquisition of a second ASTARS (ASTARS II) commenced. Unfortunately the
ASTARS II acquisition schedule slid noticeably. By the planned Initial Operation
Capability (IOC) date, the aircraft remained only partially capable and only a few
student-training exercises had been conducted. On 14 July 2004, a meeting by USNTPS
upper management was called to determine answers to the following questions: How far
iv

along is the ASTARS II program development? What will it take in cost and schedule to
complete the development? Is further development supportable? Are there options for
use as a partially mission capable aircraft? In general, management was trying to decide
whether or not the program should be cancelled.
This thesis discusses the programmatic and technical obstacles experienced in this
government-only acquisition program. Based on lessons learned and an analysis of this
material, the author made recommendations as to how acquisition programs such as this
can be conducted in a more efficient manner with an emphasis on systems analysis and
readily available program management strategies.
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PREFACE

The analyses, opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Naval Air Warfare
Center, the Naval Air Systems Command, the United States Naval Test Pilot School or
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considered attributable to any of the aforementioned authorities or for any purpose other
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NOMENCLATURE

MILITARY AIRCRAFT DESIGNATIONS
An unusual aspect of the aircraft described in this thesis is that it had two atypical
military designations. The subject aircraft, Bureau Number (BuNo) 148889 was
originally designated a UP-3A. After undergoing ‘series’ modifications to extend service
life, the aircraft was re-designated from a UP-3A to an UP-3D. Once complete with the
ASTARS II modifications the aircraft designation was changed again, this time from
UP-3D to NP-3D.
General designations for military aircraft follow a set of standardized
nomenclature in the format: type, model and series. Designations describe various
aspects of the aircraft mission and modifications. The first designation is a letter that
indicates the aircraft’s primary function and capability. For the NP-3D, that first letter is
the ‘P’, which stands for the Maritime Patrol mission defined as: “a long range, all
weather, multiengine aircraft operating from land or water bases that is modified for
independent antisubmarine warfare, maritime reconnaissance, and mining.”
The next designation given to military aircraft is the model number. The model
number identifies major design changes within the basic mission. Model numbers run
consecutively from ‘1’ to ‘999’ and appear to the immediate right of the primary function
letter, separated by a dash. So the ‘3’ in the NP-3D designation represents the third
design in Maritime Patrol.
The series letters ‘A’ and ‘D’ identify the production model of the particular
design. The designation for 148889 was changed from ‘A’ to ‘D’ because major
xiv

modifications were made to the original aircraft that significantly altered the aerospace
vehicle system components and changed the logistics support of the vehicle.
Status prefixes are uncommon among U.S. Navy aircraft because they are used to
indicate nonstandard use of an aerospace vehicle such as test, experimental, prototype,
etc. If used, the status prefix letter appears to the immediate left of the modified mission
symbol or basic mission symbol for the aircraft. The prefix ‘U’ in UP-3A was used to
identify a “special utility” mission capability, which the aircraft flew in support of
prototype projects and range support before being acquired by United States Naval Test
Pilot School (USNTPS). A prefix change from ‘U’ to ‘N’ was made for the completed
NP-3D to differentiate the aircraft’s new “permanent special test” mission at the U.S.
Naval Test Pilot School. The image in Figure 1 is a three view of the NP-3D.
(Description of Standardized MDS Designation Symbols, 1997)

Figure 1
NP-3D 3-Plane View
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
In the early 1990s, the United States Naval Test Pilot School identified the need
for a modern, highly integrated, multi-sensor training aircraft. The objective was to use
Non-Developmental Military and Commercial Off the Shelf (MOTS/COTS) items to
create a modern strike-fighter training aircraft for the instruction of U.S. and foreign test
pilots, flight officers, and test engineers in flight test techniques involving radar, Forward
Looking Infrared (FLIR), navigation, and Human Machine Interface (HMI). Specific
goals included:
•

Provide an integrated system typical of current and future tactical aircraft (A-12,
F-14, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, F-22, F-35)

•

Provide support systems typically employed in developmental test aircraft

•

Allow complete control of entire sensor suite from either of two operator stations

•

Allow instructor monitoring of all student actions

•

Maximize use of equipment already on aircraft

•

Ensure support for future growth

In August, 1994 a Statement of Work (SOW) was issued for the design, installation
and integration of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) on the U.S. Naval Test Pilot
School Airborne Systems Aircraft (ASA), on a P-3 Orion aircraft. This was later
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renamed ASTARS when the mission was expanded to include technology
demonstrations.
The Westinghouse Electronics Systems Group (later Northrop Grumman
Electronic Systems and Sensors Division) completed the design in October 1994. The
package submitted to USNTPS for review also included a Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
proposal to implement the design for $595,339. In April 1995, the proposal was
accepted, resulting in a contract award with work commencing in June 1995, and initial
deliveries in September of the same year. The first integration flight was conducted in
February 1996. Final GFE sensor installations were completed in June 1996, followed by
final system acceptance.
The first major ASTARS modification was completed in 1997 when the original
F-16 APG-66 radar was upgraded to an APG-66 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) version,
configured for foreign military use. The MLU radar provided higher performance and
additional operating modes. The fundamental design of the ASTARS system originated
from a series of avionics testbed aircraft used by Westinghouse for developmental tests of
the F-16, B-1B, YF-23, C-130 and F-22 radars. These testbeds, built on commercial
transports and light business aircraft, were designed to allow full in-flight system tests
early in an aircraft development cycle. This was to reduce developmental test costs and
to allow flexibility in the numbers and types of personnel able to participate in the test
programs.
Each test program had the benefit of lessons learned from preceding programs.
The result was that each succeeding implementation was more flexible, more modular
2

Figure 2
ASTARS System Architecture
and more capable of quickly supporting other programs, requiring fewer and smaller
specialized modifications. The finished ASTARS configuration was a generic aircraft,
which supported a wide range of radar, electro-optical, and navigation programs. The
overall systems architecture is shown in Figure 2.
The ASTARS system was similar to the federated architecture used in nextgeneration aircraft such as the F-22, Comanche and Joint Strike Fighter. All processing
was performed in multiple commercial off-the-shelf PCs. Multifunction Displays
(MFDs) were emulated using studio-grade video monitors with added bezel buttons.
Sensors included a multi-mode X-band radar (APG-66) and a turret-mounted FLIR (WF360TL) which included a visual band camera. Navigation was handled by two Inertial
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Figure 3
ASTARS Systems Configuration On The NP-3D
Navigation Systems (INS) with integrated Global Positioning System (GPS) data. A
Head Up Display (HUD) was simulated using a cockpit-mounted camera with overlaid
flight path and sensor symbology. The last of the four graphics generators provided a
digital moving map with full continental U.S. coverage. Figure 3 shows the layout of
systems in the NP-3D aircraft.

THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL ASTARS AIRCRAFT
The first ASTARS aircraft was a major success and an invaluable asset in training
students at the USNTPS, the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School (AFTPS), Empire Test
Pilot’s School (ETPS) of the United Kingdom and students in the Test and Evaluation
4

(T&E) Short Courses. By the end of 2001, 520 students from 15 different countries had
been trained on the ASTARS systems. This included students from all branches of the
military in the United States, Germany, Spain, Italy, Canada, Israel, Finland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Taiwan, Greece, Singapore, Pakistan, Switzerland,
Sweden, France, and Japan (Smith, 2004). In addition, the USNTPS was flooded with
requests for airborne systems training from many other countries in Europe, Asia, and
South America.
ASTARS I was pressured to fly continuously. Annual USNTPS syllabus
requirements were for 89 exercise flights. The T&E Short Courses were growing to 48
exercise flights per year and once the proposed Test and Evaluation University was
underway there would be a need for 84 more ASTARS exercise flights. These
requirements would be in addition to the already established semi-annual detachments to
the AFTPS and ETPS.
No aircraft is available one hundred percent of the time. Routine maintenance
events alone restricted support to current levels with no option of handling planned
growth. All of the desired flight requirements would not be met. When a more lengthy
maintenance phase was required, such as a Planned Depot Maintenance (PDM), the
ASTARS aircraft could be unavailable for months, leaving the test pilot schools without a
primary systems training platform and forcing the cancellation of syllabus instruction.
An unavoidable 8-month maintenance phase period was scheduled to start in
November 2002. If a suitable replacement aircraft could not be fielded, all ASTARS
training for the end of 2002 and start of 2003 would be lost. If any additional
5

maintenance issues surfaced, all of the 2003 systems exercises could be cancelled. The
threat of such a long downtime reinforced ideas to embark upon a development program
to field a second ASTARS aircraft by spring of 2002.
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CHAPTER 2: ACQUISITION PROCESS
CONVENTIONAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION
In order to understand the acquisition process employed by the ASTARS II team,
one must have an understanding of the defense acquisition principles and guidelines.
These guidelines are outlined in the Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition
Guidebook and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System. The process is mandatory for all major defense acquisition
programs. A primary goal of any DoD acquisition strategy is to minimize the time and
cost of satisfying an identified and validated need, consistent with common sense and
sound business practices. The conventional acquisition process is highlighted in Figure
4.

Figure 4
The Department Of Defense Acquisition Process
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At the start of any program, the user’s need must be defined and understood by
the primary stakeholders. In the case of Naval Aviation, the end user expresses the need
and, in due course, it is formally documented in a formal Mission Need Statement
(MNS), then an Operational Requirements Document (ORD). If approved for
acquisition, such needs are given funding, developed and fielded. Nothing is procured
without documented needs or requirements. In general, formalized needs are created to
identify warfighting deficiencies and/or technological opportunities through mission area
assessments of current and projected capabilities.
In order to initiate the process, the end user--the Fleet operators--express their
operational needs through the chain of command. Commanders meet annually at
Operational Advisory Group (OAG) meetings to create a ‘needs priority list’. The
priority list is forwarded to the warfare specialty Requirements Officer at the Pentagon
and the aircraft type Program Manager at Naval Aviation Systems Command. The
Requirements Officer lobbies for funding from pre-existing DoD budgets or from
Congressionally appropriated projects. The Program Manager aligns end-user priorities
amongst current aircraft acquisition developments.
Once funding is approved, a Program Manager oversees all planning, integrated
product team selection, analysis of alternatives, proposal solicitation, design selection,
risk assessment, design development, Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
construction, production of the system, and finally, fielding and supporting the system.
All tasks must meet cost, performance, schedule, and environmental constraints.
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DoD acquisition programs are required to undergo periodic statutory and
regulatory milestone reviews. Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) must be achieved in
order for the project to continue to the next phase of development. Funding is often tied
to these milestones to prevent cost overruns and further development of systems that are
not meeting performance requirements.
Prior to the Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) point, the program will undergo
both Developmental Test (DT) and Operational Test (OT). These phases evaluate the
new system at various stages of maturity to ensure that the Fleet gets an operationally
effective product. The two test organizations report their findings at various stages of the
program to a Milestone Decision Authority (a high ranking military officer or civil
servant), who decides to move the program to its next phase and eventually makes the
decision to field it. The performance of the system tested in both DT and OT is spelled
out in the TEMP. The TEMP utilizes the ORD and other documents to define the
quantitative measures that must be met for the system to perform in the employment
environment and satisfy mission suitability requirements. With a constructed TEMP and
properly executed test program, the program should conclusively meet the needs of the
end user.
Altogether, the DoD concept-to-IOC acquisition process usually takes three to
five years. In addition, the production and testing of the prototype system could take
another one to two years. This drives the time spent developing the system through the
acquisition process to as many as seven years.

9

DEFINING THE NEED
The current ASTARS system met all the user needs with one exception availability. The end user’s desire was not for greater, newer, or different performance
capabilities. The need was simply for additional asset time to teach the current test pilot
school exercises and meet forthcoming requirements. With the highly structured and
inflexible P-3 Fleet maintenance schedule, no option existed to expand availability of
ASTARS I. Moreover, in addition to the test pilot schools, the Navy was preparing to
stand up a Test and Evaluation University that could use the aircraft for 250 hours per
year (O’Connor, 2004).
An ad hoc ASTARS II team was called together to investigate the acquisition of a
second aircraft. The mission of the aircraft would be identical to ASTARS I. The
assembled team consisted of the ASTARS I aircraft monitor, the USNTPS Senior
Systems Instructor, engineering support personnel, software developers, project officers
in charge of subsystem acquisition, and a former employee from the company responsible
for the completion of ASTARS I.

PROGRAM INITIATION
ASTARS II ACQUISITION PROCESS
Like any typical DoD acquisition program, once the need was identified, the
ASTARS II product team attempted to determine what restrictions existed on plans they
selected to acquire a second ASTARS aircraft. With such well-defined performance
prerequisites, the team moved to determining an acquisition strategy. Navy acquisition
10

doctrine provided several options in the type, structure, and formality of an acquisition
program. In accordance with Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5000.2B,
administrators could bypass many of the normal steps required to produce a system and
employ an Abbreviated Acquisition Program. Program size restrictions were the first
strategy determinant. ASTARS I was produced with a modification cost of $595,339
plus the costs of taking ownership of a P-3 aircraft. SECNAV and DoD governing
documents required a formal acquisition plan under the following guidelines:
1. Development programs with a total cost of all contracts estimated at $5
million or more in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funds.
2. Production, service acquisitions, or contractor services that provide
assistance to a program office or functional organization in supporting
systems or programs, whose total cost of all contracts is estimated at $30
million or more for all years of the program; or $15 million or more for
any one fiscal year.
3. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) requirements, when dollar thresholds above
are met by either FMS alone or by combined U.S. Government and FMS
requirements.
The instructions further stated that an “Acquisition Plan is not required for
military construction, NDI, spare and repair parts; component overhaul, maintenance, or
repair at the depot, intermediate, or organizational levels.”
The team believed ASTARS II could be constructed with COTS/MOTS items
alone. They planned to use depot level construction for the student and instructor stations
as well as structural modifications for mission system components and additional crew
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capacity. All spare parts would come from military and non-developmental commercial
sources.
Since The ASTARS II development was within DoD and SECNAV guidelines for
small program and abbreviated acquisition, the team pursued in-house government
construction. As none of the standard acquisition documents and reporting milestones
were required, the ASTARS team would be responsible for satisfying only two groups:
the test pilot school end users, who required performance equal to or greater than the first
aircraft, and USNTPS upper management, who would periodically review cost and
schedule developments ensuring expenditures were within the school’s annual operating
budget.

FUNDING
With the pressing need for a second ASTARS aircraft and the perceived small
cost of producing the system, funding was promptly approved from the annual USNTPS
operating budget. However, no exact dollar amount was agreed upon nor was any
funding schedule formulated. The cost would be absorbed by the annual budget during
each subsequent funding quarter.
The team had to investigate the exact source of USNTPS funding. A large
portion of the annual budget was defined as Operations and Maintenance, Navy
(O&M,N) money. O&M,N limitations, restrictions and use were all governed by U.S.
Title Code 31, 1517 and 1301(a), which stated that “O&M,N is allocated to the service
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for the purchase of all resources consumed in operating and maintaining the Navy.”
Specific items included:
•

Civilian labor, including contractual labor

•

Rental payments on leases for equipment and facilities

•

Food, clothing, petroleum, oil and lubricant items

•

Expendable supplies and materials

•

Maintenance, repair, overhaul and rework of investment items including
real property maintenance facilities

•

Assemblies, spares and repair parts which were not designated for
centralized individual item management by an inventory control point or
central supply system that cost less than $100K

•

All other equipment items not in the preceding categories that had a unit
value limit of $100K or less and which were not designed for centralized
individual item management (O&M,N Participant Guide, 2002)

As long as the ASTARS II acquisition process was within the above guidelines
and was being used in accordance with the command’s mission and purpose, funding
could be drawn from the available O&M,N apportionment. It was up to USNTPS to
determine quarterly and annually if it could afford program continuance.

ALTERNATIVES AND AIRCRAFT SELECTION
Although the first ASTARS system was created using a P-3 Orion aircraft, the
team recognized that there could be other aircraft options for the installation of the same
or similar systems in order to train test pilots. An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was
conducted by one of the team members who had more than 20 years of military and
commercial flight test experience. The AoA was then presented to the team for
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assessment. The comparison weighted factors such as: acquisition cost and risk, utility,
syllabus support, operating costs, training requirements and supportability (Roderick
AoA, 2001). Business analysis rating scales confirmed that the P-3 was the best option.
It was specifically concluded from the AoA that a P-3A aircraft would make the most
suitable solution from a performance, cost, schedule and risk perspective.
The team explored acquisition of a P-3A. Discussions with the P-3 Program
Office from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) were conducted to identify an
aircraft that would suit the USNTPS requirements. The ideal aircraft would be one that
no longer suited Naval Aviation needs but would still possess sufficient service life for
USNTPS purposes. One area that held the greatest potential for a suitable airframe was
at the long-term military aircraft preservation at Davis-Monthan.
The ASTARS II team sent a three-member delegation to Davis-Monthan to try
and identify a candidate aircraft. Preservation personnel identified the best candidate of
all those in storage - BuNo 151394 (AMARC Trip Report, 2001). The aircraft was not a
P-3A as expected; it was a P-3B that had been with a group of reserve squadron
retirements. Of all retired aircraft, it had the most service life remaining, was in the best
maintenance condition and had many of the needed safe-for-flight modifications already
incorporated. These factors made it the most cost-effective solution with respect to
aircraft overhaul for subsequent ASTARS II modifications.
A few months after the search for an airframe started, another even more costeffective solution presented itself. The newcomer was BuNo 148889, which belonged to
a local command. It was an older P-3A, designated as a UP-3A, which was already
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performing project work at the Naval Air Station in Patuxent River. Unlike the first
aircraft considered, 148889 was already in a flyable condition, which would eliminate the
million dollar plus return-to-flight overhaul costs that would be required for Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) aircraft. Aircraft 148889 was also not
Fleet representative because it had never been equipped with acoustic or Surface
Subsurface Surveillance Coordination (SSSC) mission systems. This unusual lack of
mission equipment meant that it would, in all likelihood, never be reclaimed for Fleet
use. It had also been equipped with a unique power distribution system for research and
development projects that would simplify ASTARS modifications.
Aircraft 148889 did require a $1 million maintenance phase. That phase in
combination with a shrinking number of test projects at VX-20, resulted in this older P-3
airframe being scheduled for retirement unless a sponsor was found to assume all
maintenance and operational costs (Roderick, 2004). Considering that the first ASTARS
II candidate would cost approximately $1.6 million to refurbish and make air worthy, not
to mention the risks associated with a long downtime and a non-flyable airframe, this
new option presented many advantages. The team moved forward to take ownership of
the aircraft. The acquisition made plans for a simultaneous maintenance/modification
phase.

MODIFICATION
The only entity capable of performing the upcoming aircraft maintenance was a
Naval Air Depot (NADEP). Discussions with regional depots indicated that they could
simultaneously work the phase maintenance and ASTARS II structural modifications as
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the team had hoped. After agreeing on the final SOW with NADEP Jacksonville, FL,
and just before flying the airplane to Florida to commence work, it surfaced that NADEP
Jacksonville’s schedule would be longer than the team wanted due to a backlog of work.
A suitable facility in Greenville, NC was identified with more suitable availability than
that of Jacksonville. The aircraft was flown to Greenville and indoctrinated for PDM
with concurrent ASTARS modifications.

RADAR ACQUISITION
The FLIR and radar still had to be obtained by USNTPS. The FLIR was
relatively simple to acquire because USNTPS had several available in supply that were
supporting ASTARS I. However, finding another APG-66 proved to be more difficult.
With aircraft 148889 already undergoing maintenance and modifications, the team
explored every available option for a replacement radar system.
The ASTARS II team first tried APG-66 radar channels within the U.S. Air Force.
None were available. With the given schedule constraints, the team contacted test pilot
school counterparts at AFTPS. AFTPS was unable to locate an APG-66 radar, but
continued with a broader search for any suitable radar.
In January of 2002, AFTPS located an APG-68 radar system that was in a storage
facility at their base. Although the team would have preferred the APG-66, the APG-68
was the USAF replacement for the APG-66, and it offered some potential advantages for
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and parts support. Commonality with ASTARS I
would be lost while at the same time increasing acquisition risks, but with no other means
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of locating an APG-66 and the offer of a free radar, the team elected to pursue the APG68. Compensation for the radar would be a promise from USNTPS to support AFTPS
with biannual ASTARS systems flights by sending a detachment to AFTPS for one to
two weeks bi-annually. (Nickles, 2002)
Changing radar systems from an APG-66 to an APG-68 late in the modification
schedule introduced several issues. The team conducted informal email discussions over
several weeks in order to identify risks. Although obtaining a $1.2 million radar system
in exchange for two weeks of systems training per year seemed appealing, the ASTARS
II team was cautious. All team members had experience in military acquisition and
recognized that unknown problems were always lurking. No one had ever attempted to
put an APG-68 radar system on a P-3, and that fact alone warned of possible hurdles. As
one team member stated in the first round of discussions, “To my knowledge, no one has
an engineering package to hang an APG-68 on a P-3. As I recall, the 68 is heavier and
requires more power. A cheap radar could cost us a ton of time and have high Non
Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs.” (Elliott, 2002) Various questions surrounded the
APG-68.
During the email discussions two major issues surfaced. First, the APG-68 power
requirements were much higher than the APG-66. However, the power supply system on
148889 was sufficient to handle the new radar. The second issue was that the APG-68
radar antenna weighed 63 pounds more than that of the APG-66. A quick mounting
bracket structural analysis showed that anything less than 100 lbs difference in weight
would be insignificant.
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Unknowns remained, but a reasonable explanation was found for every question
raised, and the problems brought forward were judged to be solvable. The team surmised
that the APG-68 radar was worth the risk and should be pursued for ASTARS II. It was
this risk analysis that finalized the acquisition study and resulted in abandonment of the
APG-66 in favor of the APG-68 system. Below are representative APG-68 installation,
modification and employment risk assessment issues and a summary of the risks
mitigated:
Question: “What condition is the equipment in?”
Response: “Our Integrated Facility for Avionics Systems Testing (IFAST) folks
have been running a survey and checking out of this radar equipment. According
to them, the APG-68 antenna, Dual Mode Transmitter (DMT), Modular Low
Power Radio Frequency (MLPRF), and Programmable Signal Processor (PSP) all
work fine with Block 30 and Block 40.”
Risk interpretation: Radar components are in a fully functioning condition. The
Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) will not require repair or replacement, which will
minimize and return-to service costs.”

Question: “Are there limitations to operation with current APG-68 supply system
parts? What block is the radar?”
Response: “IFAST tells me that the DMT, MLPRF, and APG-68 antenna should
be able to run with all USAF Blocks with the proper avionics configuration.
However, with the PSP it has now, this radar can only run Block 30, Signal
Conditioning Unit (SCU) 4, and Block 40 (T1 - T6). In addition, if it were to run
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on SCU 4.1, the Electronic Emulating Flight Control Computer (EEFCC) needed
for the avionics system, or the Block 40T7 PSP, needs to be upgraded with more
memory. Furthermore, if these units were to run with a more advanced USAF
Operational Flight Program (OFP) (such as Block 50 and MMC) the PSP would
need to be upgraded to Advanced Programmable Signal Processor (APSP) with
additional hardware (such as a MMC).
They also said the DMT, MLPRF, and Antenna could be run with an
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) OFP. However, the MLPRF would need to have
the appropriate A-13 FMS controller/Central Processing Unit (CPU) board. He
said that nowadays there aren't many FMS programs that run with a PSP.
Therefore, a specific APSP and avionics configuration would be required.”
Risk interpretation: The system is compatible with the current USAF APG-68
component supply chain so parts support should not be an issue. Configuration
management will remain a risk; future LRU replacement and repair may cause
incompatibilities that will not allow the system to function.

Question: “What software load does it have? USAF or FMS? If a USAF load,
would there be any releasability issues?”
Response: “The IFAST engineers tell me the OFP ID load on the PSP is 6310.
This is an USAF development Block 30, used before 1993. We are checking to
see if we can obtain a non-country specific FMS-like baseline load that we can
use in our Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) lab with foreign students. If it
works out, we may also be able to load this into this APG-68 radar set. This
should eliminate any country proprietary and releasability issues.”
Risk interpretation: A large percent of the USNTPS, AFTPS, ETPS and T&E
Short Course (future T&E University) students are Foreign Nationals, which
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limits the type of information that can be displayed. United States Air Force Test
Pilot School (USAFTPS) may be able to assist with the releasability issues, but
the risk will have to be further mitigated by the ASTARS II software designers
with the support of team security researchers.

Question: “What is the history of the radar? Was it a test article? Was it
warehoused in the past 10 years? Any known previous usage?”
Response: “I'm told that the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright
Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) took a brand spanking new radar and put it into
storage 10 years ago. This is the set we now have in our possession. When we
acquired it, we took it over to our IFAST to have them check out the LRUs. We
wanted to make sure it wasn't a piece of junk or that it hadn't ‘gone bad’ while
sitting in storage. They said that all of the LRUs physically look fine. They
found no damage and all National Stock Number (NSNs), Part Number (P/Ns),
and Serial Numbers (S/Ns) matched up with the invoice. The three DMT,
MLPRF, and PSP LRUs were checked out on the IFAST Radar Station with their
existing APG-68 antenna. The engineers reported that all three LRUs functioned
properly.”
Risk interpretation: The radar appeared to be in good condition. All LRUs were
in a functioning condition, which indicated no replacement or repairs would be
required.

Question: “What is the support vehicle/posture (software, parts, etc)? Will/could
we be included in a USAF support contract?”
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Response: “Yes, we have a logistics trail you could use. To be honest, it might
slow down a little with an extra step (us) in the middle. Is it possible for you to
use the same logistics trail you already have for your APG-66? Or, I understand
the Navy had F-16's. Maybe you could fold into their support trail? Naturally,
our management says we won't pay for you to use this radar. So, if you need a
box, you'll have to pay for it. However, we can provide the support vehicle where
you'd send in the box and Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) us
the money for the fix (sic). Therefore, either way you want to go, the long answer
is ‘yes’, we can provide you with a support vehicle, if you have no other means.”
Risk interpretation: If a support vehicle trail cannot be created directly from the
USNTPS supply system, AFTPS is willing to act as a go-between to tie into the
Air Force supply system. Additional investigation into former USN F-16s
indicated that the aircraft are no longer in use and are in preservation at DavisMonthan. The preserved aircraft also had their radars removed, so no spare parts
exist anywhere in the Navy. The logistics support system for the APG-66 will not
be an option because that partnership of APG-66 users does not have APG-68
users. There is no commonality between APG-66 and APG-68 LRUs so none of
the support items for the ASTARS I radar system will be of any use. USNTPS
will be on their own to replace APG-68 parts, nonetheless, the risks associated
with this process are low because the means to get LRUs exists and the MTBF on
the APG-68 is better than the APG-66.

Question: “Are all LRUs included with the radar, including rack? Will any spare
parts be included (ideally another ship set)?”
Response: “IFAST says it's all there. The following are the six LRUs that would
be provided:
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1. APG-68 Antenna, S/N 10481
2. DMT, S/N 11114
3. Modular Low Power Radio Frequency (MLPRF), S/N 10750
4. Programmable Signal Processor (PSP), S/N 10969
5. A Rack assembly that holds 3 LRUs, S/N 10010 (PSP, DMT, and
MLPRF)
6. Digital Computer, S/N 0203
No we don't have any spares in this package. Also, we don't have access to a
second ship set. However, to have both an APG-66 and 68 loaded onto your two
systems aircraft should be beneficial. You'd be able to provide your students with
two different looks at a similar system.”
Risk interpretation: All parts and subcomponents to the APG-68 appear to be
included. During the acquisition and modification process, replacement for any
failed or defective items will result in ASTARS II modification delays equal to
the time required to obtain a replacement subcomponent, which may affect Initial
Operations Capability (IOC).

Question: “Is this radar ‘free’ or are there any costs we will have to pick up with
the radar?”
Response: “Well, it's not exactly ‘free’. Now, you won't have to ship us a bag of
money, but there are a few considerations we'd like:
•

Scheduling priority for our Avionics System Test and Training
Aircraft (ASTTA) support when we need it.

•

Since we'd be "loaning" you a $1.2-million radar, we'd like a longterm rate break for our ASTTA support. Now, the USAF legal office
22

says we can't put these "barter" deals into Memorandum Of
Agreements (MOA). So, we'd like a gentleman's agreement that we'd
be taken care of.
•

Priority for use of the new P-3 with the APG-68 radar installed.”

Risk interpretation: No risk mitigation. Cost of accepting the radar from AFTPS
will be higher priority support for AFTPS training over other commitments. With
two fully mission capable ASTARS aircraft no issues should arise. During times
when only one aircraft is available, USNTPS syllabus events will have to move
later in the schedule.

Question: “When will the radar be available and what is the mechanism (and time
period) for transfer to us?”
Response: “The radar is essentially checked out (not as an integrated system) and
ready to go out the door today. We'd use a DD Form 1149, in connection with a
MOA to loan the radar to you. This should be enough to get you rolling. Let me
know if there is anything else you need.” (Nickels, 2002)
Risk interpretation: Modification schedule risks were reduced since the system
would be available right away.
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CHAPTER 3: THE ASTARS II SYSTEM
Aircraft modification and maintenance (PDM) phase started in January of 2002 at
the Greenville, NC Aviation Depot facility. Modification was conducted in two stages.
The first stage completed all necessary ASTARS modifications with the exception of the
evaluator station mock “cockpit” and structural support that would allow for more
ditching stations (20 g impact design limit). The mock cockpit was built by NAVAIR
Test Article Preparation (TAP) facilities located at Naval Air Station Patuxent River,
MD.
Aircraft structural modifications included the Test Conductor Station, fabrication
of a computer cabinet, floor upgrades, construction of an aft lavatory and a galley
upgrade similar to the P-3C aircraft design. Avionics upgrades included the APG-68
radar, GPS, FLIR, Ring-laser Inertial Navigation Unit (RINU), ARC-210 radios,
Intercom System (ICS), 60 Hz converters, interior lighting, transformer rectifier, and a
new power distribution panel. Upon completion of all structural modifications, the
aircraft had an aircrew and student capacity increase from 8 to 23. This included three in
the cockpit, one at the Evaluator Station, two at the Test Conductor Station and the
remaining dispensed among the aft observer stations, galley seats and 12 airline style
seats. The first phase took eight months to complete. The aircraft was flown back to
Patuxent River, MD at the end of 2002. The aircraft was indoctrinated into the Patuxent
River TAP facilities for construction of the evaluator’s station and additional structural
modifications for increased crew capacity. By April of 2003, the aircraft was ready for
ground testing.
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DESCRIPTION OF TEST AIRCRAFT
BASIC AIRCRAFT
NP-3D, BuNo 148889, was a Fleet representative P-3A basic airframe, but not
Fleet representative from the installed mission systems viewpoint. It was a special
purpose P-3, which was formerly used by Naval Air Developmental Test Center and VX20. P-3 acoustic and Surface Subsurface Surveillance Coordination (SSSC) missions
systems were not installed. It had a unique electrical power distribution system to
support project equipment, and a strengthened floor to accommodate rack and platemounted project equipment.
The NP-3D aircraft, built by Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Company,
was an all-weather military, four-engine, low-wing, turboprop aircraft designed for
maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and fleet support. The
multi-mission aircraft had a gross takeoff weight of 135,000 lbs and was powered by four
T56-A-14 turboprop engines. The aircraft was airframe limited to 300 KIAS and had a
maximum operating altitude of 35,000 ft. The standard flight crew consisted of two
pilots, one flight engineer, two naval flight officers and one in-flight technician. The
avionics system coordinated navigation information and accepted sensor data inputs for
tactical display and storage. A detailed description of the NP-3D aircraft can be found in
the Naval Air Training and operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manuals for
P-3C aircraft, NAVAIR 01-75PAC-1, NAVAIR 01-75PAC-1-1, the ASTARS Operator’s
Manual Revision 3 and the Pilot’s Manual for the AN/APG-68 Fire Control Radar as
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Table 1
NP-3D ASTARS Envelope
NATOPS Limit

Parameter
Airspeed (KIAS)
Altitude (ft MSL)
Load Factor (g)
FLIR Turret Extended
FLIR Turret
Extend/retract

NAVAIR Flight
Clearance
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
-405
-300
-35,000
--1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
-300
---300
---

installed in the USNTPS ASTARS Aircraft. The aircraft operating envelope is shown in
Table 1.

COCKPIT
Full ASTARS II system display and navigation capabilities were provided in the
cockpit (Figure 3). One limitation in the cockpit was that there was only one MFD to
display the systems and flight profile information. A single hand controller and
multifunction keypad were installed at the copilot's seat to control navigation outputs and
the MFD display.

FORWARD OBSERVERS
Two observer stations were installed in the crew stations just behind the cockpit.
The left station had a color MFD identical to the student and instructor stations. This
MFD was also used as a spare for the other eight mock-up MFDs in the aircraft. The
right forward observer’s station displayed system video on an existing monochrome
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video display. These observer stations had 16-position thumbwheel switches, allowing
selection of all possible sensor video sources.

AFT OBSERVATION
Video lines were provided for two aft observer displays. The aft observers had no
video selection controls and were dependent on the other operators to select their desired
sensor.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEMS
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
The crew stations utilized commercial Avalex Active Matrix Liquid Crystal
Displays (AMLCD), appropriately shielded and mounted for implosion protection and
configured with pushtiles as MFDs). Multifunction hand controllers provided sensor
control and operator interface. System control and video conversion was processed by
five commercially available ruggedized computers in a rack-mounted chassis. The
instructor/test conductor station was mounted on a standard 19-inch rack. It included
four MFDs and two hand controllers, and was designed as the controlling source for
system power and video recording. The student/evaluator station was a replica of the
proposed A-12 cockpit, using four MFDs and two hand controllers, as shown in Figure 5.
Either station could control any sensor through the hand controllers and pushtiles and
route the video to any of the displays at that station. Radar, FLIR, moving map, and
HUD camera video was available. In addition, there was a display repeater at the NAV
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Figure 5
ASTARS Hand Controllers

station and the pilot station to view, but not control systems. Interlocks were provided to
prevent radar radiation on deck and to shut down the radar in the event of overheating.

WF-360TL FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED SENSOR
The WF-360TL sensor head contained a FLIR sensor, daylight TV camera, and a
laser range finder. The sensors were housed in an environmentally self-contained,
stabilized gimbal that was ruggedized for aircraft use. Full 360-degree azimuth coverage
was provided. The FLIR operated in the 8-12 µmeter range utilizing mechanically
scanned, cryogenically-cooled 480x4 linear array mercury-cadmium-telluride detectors.
FLIR specifications were as follows: cooldown time of 5 to 8 minutes, Noise Equivalent
Delta Temperature (NE∆T) of 0.11 deg C, a narrow field of view 2.7 deg x 3.6 deg, and a
wide field of view 11.1 deg x 14.8 deg with 360 deg azimuth coverage from +30 deg to –
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85 deg in elevation. The WF-360TL FLIR consisted of five LRUs as shown in Table 2.
A depiction of the WF-360 is shown in Figure 6.
In addition to the primary Infrared (IR) detector, the WF-360TL offered added
capabilities provided by a co-aligned optical camera and laser range finder. The optical
camera was a monochrome 768 x 488 pixel Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) camera
mounted in the same turret and provided the option of obtaining higher resolution images
when sufficient light was available. The video camera was not low-light level capable
and was unusable for unlighted targets in shadows or after dusk. The WF-360TL used a
solid-state, single-burst laser to provide active ranging to targets. The laser was
considered eye-safe, but required specific operator actions to arm and fire. The
contractor furnished laser range finder characteristics are shown in Table 3. The WF360TL FLIR could be set to the pointing and tracking modes depicted in Table 4. The
ASTARS mission computer managed five WF-360TL FLIR hand controllers, mapping
them to the displays. The following FLIR functions were available from the hand
controllers:
1.

Zoom in / out

2.

Slew to line of sight

3.

Toggle track modes or make sensor of interest

4.

Recenter to boresight

5.

Slave to sensor of interest

6.

Slave to waypoint

7.

Toggles from FLIR to TV

8.

Toggle from black hot to white hot
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Table 2
WF-360TL Forward Looking Infrared Components
LRU
Gimbaled Turret
Turret Drive
Avionics Electronics
Image Interface
Control Panel

Size (inches)
16 x 22
8 x 8.5 x 21
12 x 8.8 x 21
9 x 6.5 x 11
9 x 5.8 x 7

Weight (lbs)
145
33
42
16
7

PITCH LATCH
ASSY

PITCH RING

CRYO ASSY

TV CAMERA /
LENS ASSY

LASER TRANSMITTER
RECEIVER ASSY

PITCH TRIM
FLIR SCAN
ASSY
FLIR DETECT
FOCUS MOTOR
IR AFOCAL ASSY
FLIR RELAY
ASSY

FLIR WFOV
LENS BARREL

Figure 6
WF-360TL Forward Looking Infrared System
(Source: ASTARS Operating Manual)
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Table 3
Laser Range Finder Characteristics
Parameter
Pulse energy
Beam divergence
Range
Resolution

Specification
16 millijoules
1.0 milliradians
50 - 9,995 meters
5 meters

Table 4
WF-360TL Pointing And Tracking Modes
Tracking Mode
CAGED
GROUND TRACK
AREA TRACK
POINT TRACK
SLAVE

Description
The FLIR line of sight was fixed at zero azimuth
and a small depression angle
The FLIR remained at a fixed location on the
surface of the earth
The FLIR attempted to keep the entire scene
stable in the display
The point track mode was optimized to track
small, well defined targets which were distinct
from the background scene
The FLIR was slaved to the Sensor Point of
Interest (SPI) or to the current navigation
reference point

AN/APG-68 RADAR
The AN/APG-68 was a coherent, digital, multimode radar derived from the
AN/APG-66 and introduced into service in the Lockheed F-16 with Block 30/40 aircraft
and used in subsequent blocks. The radar featured an electrically driven antenna, a
MLPRF unit that featured plug-in modules and an air-cooled DMT that permitted the
radar to operate using low, medium and high-pulse repetition frequencies (PRFs). This
hardware capability and flexibility allowed the radar to be optimized easily for any air-toair or air-to-ground search, track or mapping scenario. Since programmatic comparisons
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and risks that existed when replacing the APG-66 with an APG-68 are a primary focus of
this paper, a short description of both radars follows.

AN/APG-66 RADAR
The APG-66 was a medium power, single-channel, low and medium PRF
multimode radar that employed a mechanically scanned, planar-array antenna. The fully
coherent system included a traveling wave tube (TWT) transmitter to generate
approximately 21.5 kW peak power. Pulse-Doppler techniques were employed in air-toair modes. Four operator selectable channels were available with frequency agility
employed within each channel. The specifications for the APG-66 radar are shown in
Table 5.
The AN/APG-68 incorporated a total of 25 air-to-air and air-to-surface modes of
operation. Air-to-air modes were designed to detect, track and engage targets at all
aspects and altitudes, even in the presence of ground clutter. Air-to-surface modes were
designed to provide mapping, target detection, location, tracking and navigation
capability. The radar employed low PRF for air-to-surface use and medium and high
PRF modes for longer-range air intercept. The specifications for the APG-68 radar are
shown in Table 6. The AN/APG-68 radar is depicted in Figure A-1. The AN/APG, as
installed in the NP-3D aircraft, is shown in Figure A-2.
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Table 5
AN/APG-66 Radar Specifications
Parameter
Peak Transmit power
Beam width
Maximum scan rate
Noise figure
Frequency
PRF, Air Search
Volume
Weight
Search range
Power
Transmitter
Antenna
Range scales
Azimuth scan
Elevation coverage
Number of units
Reliability
Cooling

Specification
21.5 kW
3.2 deg azimuth, 4.8 deg elevation
62 deg/s
3.9 dB
8-12.5 GHz
7.7 - 14.9 kHz
0.13 m3
149 kg
160 nmi (air-to-air), 80 nmi (air-to-ground)
5,200 VA
Gridded, multiple peak power traveling wave tube
Planar array, 740 × 480 mm
10, 20, 40, 80, 160 nmi
±10 deg, ±25 deg, ±30 deg, ±60 deg
1, 2, 3 or 4 bar
4 LRUs, all in the nose of the aircraft
264/390 h MTBF
9.9 kg/min at 27 deg C

Table 6
AN/APG-68 Radar Specifications
Parameter
Peak Transmit power
Beam width
Maximum scan rate
Noise figure
Frequency
PRF
Volume
Weight
Search range
Power
Transmitter
Antenna
Range scales
Azimuth scan
Elevation coverage
Number of units

Specification
17.5 kW at low duty (0.03 max)
1.75 kW at high duty (0.45 max)
3.25 deg azimuth, 4.55 deg elevation
65 deg/s for RWS (horizontal scan)
84.6 deg/s for ACM 10x40 (vertical scan)
3.25 dB
9.695-9.905 GHz (Radar Modes)
9.375 GHz (BCN transmit)
0.077 - 310 kHz
0.13 m3
172 kg
160 nmi (air-to air), 80 nmi (air-to-ground)
5,600 VA
Gridded, multiple peak power traveling wave tube
Planar array, 740 × 480 mm
10, 20, 40, 80, 160 nmi
±10 deg, ±25 deg, ±30 deg, ±60 deg
1, 2, 3 or 4 bar
5 LRUs, all in the nose of the aircraft
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INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM
LTN-72 INS
The LTN-72 Inertial Navigation System (INS), made by Litton Industries, was a
two degree of freedom, gyro-stabilized, analytical inertial navigation system. It consisted
of four LRUs: (1) a mode selector unit, located on the Pilot-side instrument panel, which
provided for power application and mode selection; (2) a Control Display Unit (CDU),
located at the Navigator station, which provided display of navigation data and selection
of navigation functions; (3) a battery unit which provided approximately 15 minutes of
back-up DC power; and (4) an Inertial Navigation Unit which provided a stable platform
for the four accelerometer system and incorporated a power supply and navigation
computer to compute navigation information.

LTN-92 INS
The LTN-92 INS, also manufactured by Litton Industries, was a strap-down INS
incorporating ring-laser gyro stabilization. It was also comprised of four LRUs: (1) a
mode selector unit, located on the Pilot-side instrument panel which provided for power
application and mode selection; (2) a CDU, located at the Navigator station, which
provided display of navigation data and selection of navigation functions; (3) a battery
unit which provided approximately 30 minutes of back-up DC power; and (4) an Inertial
Navigation Unit which incorporated the RLG package and navigation computer. The
LTN-92 was aided by the ARN-151 GPS at a rate of once per second to increase the
accuracy and reliability of the system.
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ARN-151(V)2 GPS
The ARN-151(V)2 GPS consisted of an AS-3822/URN fixed reception pattern
antenna and an R-2332/AR 5-channel receiver processor unit. The system required a
minimum of four satellite signals to develop accurate fixing information. The receiver
processor was integrated with the mission computer through a MIL-STD-1553B data bus.
The GPS system did not require any external inputs for initialization or operation and
provided storage of 20,000 waypoints and a 200 waypoint local identifier database.

MOVING MAP
The moving map was a COTS system from Horizons Technology that provided
continuously updated pixel-based maps to the operator. The map coverage ranged from a
Joint Operations Graphic (JOG) (1:250,000 scale) map through a Jet Navigation Chart
(JNC) (1:2,000,000 scale) map. The LTN-92 INS provided either an ARN-151 GPS
aided or an unaided navigation solution to update ownship position on the moving map.
The moving map acted as the navigation reference point source for the system; all other
sensors could display or be slaved to the moving map's navigation reference point. The
map display scale could be selected to 5, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 500, and 1000 nmi scales.
A waypoint library contained all Very High Frequency Omni-directional Radio-ranges
(VORs) in the continental U.S. (approximately 1300) and up to 99 user-defined
waypoints. The waypoints were loaded via a waypoint file on the map computer hard
drive or in the removable disk drive. The map also stored up to 99 mark points, which
could be created in flight. The moving map is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7
ASTARS Moving Map
HEAD UP DISPLAY
The simulated HUD used on the ASTARS was designed with graphics overlaid
on real-time images from a cockpit-mounted video camera. An off-the-shelf multi-media
card combined the camera input and Video Graphics Array (VGA) graphics generated by
a dedicated IBM PC class computer. The composite image was then viewed on a
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), providing a visual scene identical to that generated by a HUD
camera looking through an actual HUD combiner glass, but lacking the peripheral cues
and collimated (focused at infinity) aspects of a real HUD. All symbology was displayed
using bright green lines to closely emulate the green CRTs used in high-brightness
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HUDs. The camera lens was selected to give a field of view similar to current tactical
HUDs (approximately 22° x 30°). The ASTARS HUD is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8
ASTARS System HUD
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CHAPTER 4: TEST, EVALUATION AND CORRECTIONS
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE FAILURES
Initial ground testing started April 20 2003. The purpose was threefold: conduct
an Electromagnetic Compatibility Safety of Flight Test (EMC SOFT) prior to the
aircraft’s Functional Check Flight (FCF), perform the first power-on checks of the
AN/APG-68 radar and perform a complete system checkout of the ASTARS II to
compare performance/functionality with the ASTARS I configuration.
An EMC SOFT was completed with the radar powered down. An additional
EMC SOFT would be required once the radar was in fully functioning condition.
Representative hardware and software test results are listed in Tables 7 and 8. Solutions
to the failures and anomalies discovered are also included in the sample results. Overall,
non-radar related hardware and software problems were being fixed at a rapid rate, which
encouraged the team belief that 148889 could be fully mission capable in a very short
time.

RADAR-SPECIFIC TEST RESULTS
The radar failed to power up or respond to inputs from both the instructor station
and the student station during ground test events. It was determined that radar cabling
was configured incorrectly. This was verified with temporary jumper cables that were
used to provide radar video. Although the radar display functioned and power-up
sequence was completed, the radar still did not complete Built in Test (BIT) or operate in
any settings.
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Table 7
Hardware Failures
Hardware Failure
Found one of the four new sticks had no
elevation slew output
Video selection switch at the NAV station
did not operate properly.
Found an error in the bezel cable diagram.

Found slew controls on two of the four
new sticks to be slightly misaligned,
resulting in cross coupling between
azimuth and elevation slew inputs.
The 20-button panel in the cockpit does
not operate properly with the mission
computer.

Resolution
Made repairs to the stick. All sticks now
have proper response from all slews,
knobs and switching.
Found a pin in one connector in the wrong
location and found an error in mission
computer software. Fixed both, video
select switch now works properly.
This could have been handled with a
significant software change or by making
a change to the bezel cables. Decision
was made to change cables, which was
then completed prior to next integration
session.
Adjusted orientation of the slew elements.

Cause was wiring misalignment between
the panel and the cockpit digital Input /
Output (I/O) unit. Required only
rearranging pins in the connector to the
control panel.
No video from the radar.
The video line from the radar was
improperly connected to the radar
processor. The proper connector used an
unusual reverse-gender BNC connector.
Temporary jumper cables were used to
continue testing until the connector on the
video line was changed to the proper type
required for first flight.
Source: (Eide Daily, 2003) (Whelan Daily, 2003)
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Table 8
Software Failures
Software Failure
Sensor azimuth and elevation slew inputs
were opposite to intended design
convention.
MRK button on MAP was inoperative.
Works from Target Management Switch
(TMS).

Resolution
Used a stick from 443 to confirm that the
problem was with software and not the
new sticks. Corrected software.
Pin numbering on the high-density
connectors on the digital I/O units was not
clearly identified in any of the
manufacturer's documentation. Made a
minor change to mission computer
software to adapt to the actual wiring
configuration.
Changed radar MFD software to control
overlay generator properly.

Found that radar MFD software disabled
video output when no radar 1553 bus
traffic was found.
Video switching on the FLIR MFD did not Problem was caused by a minor coding
operate properly.
error, which was corrected.
Map Computer drive boot order was
floppy, then hard disk. This resulted in
waypoint floppies not being available for
new system waypoint input.
All MFD functionality present, however
controls were very sensitive resulting in
frequent overshoots. May be a result of
bezel key "bounce" or too high a sampling
rate.
Map smearing during freeze (FRZ)
operations with slews outside of the
original map area.

Complementary Metal-Oxide
Semiconductor (CMOS) boot drive order
was modified to read the hard disk first.
Changed the bezel button repeat delay to
eliminate unintended multiple inputs.

Found the source of map smearing when
slewing. Changed software to prevent
smearing. The only correction for this was
to change the range scale up/down.

Source: (Eide Daily, 2003) (Whelan Daily, 2003)
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RADAR OVERHEAT
The following ground evaluation period resulted in radar overheat and subsequent
shut down after just a few minutes of operation. LRU temperatures were qualitatively
assessed by the test crew. The PSP was extremely hot while all other LRUs were only
slightly warm. The radar system cooling fan appeared to be operating properly. They
hypothesized that the problem was probably airflow balancing. A suggestion for
improving airflow included removing the PSP and changing the size of the outlet orifices
in the cooling plenum.
The team also believed the PSP external overheat sensor was not close enough to
the PSP to properly indicate component overheat temperatures. This may have resulted
in the system shutting down before indications of overheat. It was suggested that the
overheat sensor be repositioned so that it would be nearly in contact with the PSP. The
ASTARS test team found that the overheat sensor was cool to the touch even though the
PSP had already shutdown due to overheating.
After failure to launch on Test Flight #1 and complete any radar test events,
technicians and the software designer met for a weekend session to solve as many
problems as possible. The team investigated airflow and component functioning and
believed airflow rates were the cause of the overheat indications. Several cooling fan and
ducting combinations were attempted using fans and ducts already in place in attempts to
increase cooling to the PSP. The radar system still failed to function.
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RADAR PSP CONFIGURATION
Attempts to run the radar past BIT were, in part, caused by overheating, but a
another major hindrance to solving configuration and wiring problems was a lack of
Interface Control Documents (ICD). Without knowing if the hardware issues were to
blame for the radar not functioning past start-up, it was difficult to ascertain if other
issues were contributing to the problems as well. Preciously identified troubles with
locally manufactured cabling and inadvertent power phase reversals prompted further
configuration study.
This study showed that the PSP was running a pre-1993 Operational Flight
Program (OFP) while the other LRUs operated with a newer hardware and software
configuration. According to AN/APG-68 experts, the individual radar units were
incompatible and would not work together with the current OFP mix. Further
complicating the problem was the fact that none of the APG-68 designers or users had
ICDs for the older configuration. The only way to be certain that the PSP was working as
designed was to get a thorough bench test. Unfortunately, the ASTARS II team had no
means of testing the PSP functionality or any radar LRUs. Northrop-Grumman radar
systems in Baltimore had some test options, but not to the level required for a full box
check. A quick logistics check showed that ordering a newer compatible PSP from the
supply system would cost the program $327,395.59.
Background records showed that all radar LRUs were inspected and bench
checked individually before being shipped from the Air Force, but a fully-integrated
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radar system check had never been conducted before attempting to do so on the P-3
aircraft.
In June an ICD arrived. The ASTARS team was able to get the radar further
along in the start-up process and could display more fault pages. Nonetheless an APG-68
had never been installed on a P-3 aircraft and the only real way to determine the status of
the radar would be to send the PSP to an APG-68 repair facility. The team made contact
with the world’s foremost APG-68 experts at the IFAST Hill AFB, UT who handled all
USAF APG-68 repairs. IFAST agreed to assist with the troubleshooting. The PSP was
sent to Utah to be tested, arriving mid-July.
Bench and lab testing showed that the PSP would not complete a built-in test.
The fault codes, shown in Table 9, indicated that the PSP was inoperative. Attempts to
reload the PSP with SCU5.1 & Block 40 software did not work. The Aircraft
Intermediate Shop (AIS) tried to run the PSP on their test station to check out
subcomponent functionality so that possible defective modules could be isolated which
would minimize repair costs. However, every effort was rejected by the PSP.
Finally, the PSP went through several lab test methods, but did not respond. That
further indicated that the PSP was defective. Additionally, the PSP did not have
sufficient memory to hold the latest SCU5 or Block 40. This particular PSP needed to be
replaced from the supply system. The part number needed was the more modern PSP
version, part number 783R240G01 S/N 20237 or later.
The results of extensive IFAST testing meant two things. First, the PSP was
inoperable. Second, even if it were operable, the OFP was definitely incompatible with
43

Table 9
Radar BIT Indications
Failure Code
FCR 004
FCR 005
FCR 007
FCR 008
FCR 020
FCR 021
FCR 024
FCR 084
FCR 085
FCR 088
FCR 089
FCR 095
FCR 214

Description
Antenna digibus wraparound test failed
System waveguide pressure failed
Azimuth and elevation motor
Antenna ARC- computer count
MLPRF digibus wraparound test
Receiver protector fail
Reference oscillator lock bit
DMT digibus wraparound test
Low voltage power supply fault
Hi voltage power supply fault
Transmitter OK on
Hi voltage wraparound test
PSP digibus external wraparound test

the rest of the ASTARS II APG-68 components. The system would not work without a
new PSP compatible with the other system components.
The PSP was shipped back to USNTPS as the team investigated PSP upgrade. As
it turned out, the military parts system no longer supported the older PSP, and the supply
system would not allow replacement or upgrading the old PSP. The team was again
faced with the prospect of purchasing a new PSP. Additional attempts to submit the PSP
to the DoD supply system for repair and a software upgrade failed. A break for the team
occurred when DoD supply personnel agreed to take the old PSP in and replace it without
charge at the request of the IFAST team.
Three months later the new PSP arrived. It was installed in September of 2003, a full
seven months after the aircraft was supposed to IOC.
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RADAR SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Despite installation of a fully functioning PSP, the radar still did not function
properly. With continuing hardware, software and configuration problems, the team
decided to get the entire APG-68 overhauled by IFAST. The team agreed that a full
system check was crucial to alleviate the tedious and time consuming serial
troubleshooting that had delayed fielding ASTARS II. The team could not clearly assess
whether radar problems, component issues, cooling or modification wiring faults were
the root cause of the inoperable radar.

RADAR SYSTEM TEST SCHEDULE
Although the team began planning a trip to Hill AFB in October of 2003,
departure was delayed until March 2004 due to maintenance issues and the holidays.
Once at Hill, the IFAST personnel were able to load up the LRUs on the ground test
station, use new IFAST parts as required, and verify performance as a set with IFAST
avionics.

RADAR SYSTEM TEST RESULTS
Upon arrival in Utah, the team removed all APG-68 equipment from the racks and
sent them in for tests. The first two discrepancies discovered were a bad MLPRF and a
bad antenna.
On the second day, the team installed good equipment, but still had a problem
with the antenna locking up and the system not completing the start up BIT. All avenues
were exhausted in attempts to get the antenna functioning.
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On day three, the new antenna was removed and sent back for testing to
determine its condition. During this time, the team explored rack wiring harness issues.
The IFAST team helped install a new wiring harness. With the new wiring harness and
confirmed good antenna, the system worked for the first time. The ASTARS II team was
extremely relieved to finally have the radar working.
In terms of faulty components, four of the five main LRUs from the “free” radar
initially received were bad. The team had seen two bad PSPs (the initial unit plus the
first one from supply), two bad radar antennas (the initial unit plus the first one from
supply), a bad MLPRF and an inoperable rack harness.
The rest of the time at IFAST was used to analyze software and cooling issues on
the system. The system was subsequently secured for the return trip to Patuxent River.
The defective antenna and MLPRF were left with IFAST for repair. IFAST was
extremely supportive and loaned the ASTARS II team the functioning harness until
payment could be arranged.
The team felt there was a light at the end of the tunnel. Now that the radar was
working, only one major issue remained, a solution to the cooling problem.

RADAR COOLING
IFAST gave the team the actual cooling air requirements based on flow and
temperature. For a cooling air supply of 27 deg C, the flow rate should have been 21.9
lbs/min. Since the aircraft normal operating conditions were in hot weather during
training exercises, plans were formulated to test the worst-case conditions. The team’s
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next step was to test the current fan and determine what cooling temperatures and flow
rate would be required to keep the radar from reaching thermal shutdown temperatures in
hot weather, which was defined as a MIL-STD-210B hot day (103 deg F) environment.

COOLING TESTS
The purpose of the ground test was to determine the proper mass airflow cooling
requirement necessary to operate the AN/APG-68 Radar Set both on the ground and inflight without experiencing overheating conditions and system shutdown.

DESCRIPTION OF TEST EQUIPMENT
The cooling fan that was installed (EG&G Rotron, Part No. 035392) provided
ambient cooling airflow drawn from the radome to the cooling air manifold that supplied
air to the individual units of the radar set. The fan was rated to provide at least 314
ft3/min at a mass airflow rate of 21.9 lbs/min. Another fan was used to exhaust ambient
air within the radome to the nose wheel well, where it was exhausted overboard.

METHOD OF TEST
The scope of the AN/APG-68 Radar Set cooling system ground test was to utilize
the NP-3D in an operational environment. Specific goals for this test included: (1)
determining the correct size of cooling fan for proper mass airflow; (2) determining
airflow value at the radar manifold cooling inlet; and (3) verifying the capability to
maintain radar system exhaust temperatures at or below 70 deg C (158 deg F) with the
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required 21.9 lbs/min mass airflow, which equated to 314 ft3/min at 27.2 deg C (80.9 deg
F) ambient temperature. A 60 deg C exhaust temperature was selected to provide a
margin of error to the 70 deg C maximum allowable exhaust temperature of the PSP.
The PSP was thermally protected to shutdown at 70 deg C. The tests were conducted
within the limits of the P-3 NATOPS with the exception that the radome was open
throughout the test. The radar was not transmitted on the ground for personnel safety
reasons. A ground air conditioning cart was used to provide the required mass airflow to
the radar. The data was recorded on a Fieldworks portable computer through an
InstruNet Model 100B Analog-Digital Input/Output interface. Data was downloaded
onto an MS/Excel Spreadsheet for analysis.
Two ground tests were conducted, one on June 3 and one on June 7, 2004.
During the June 3rd test, the air conditioning cart was used to provide ambient (nonrefrigerated) air to the radar. The second ground test conducted on June 7th utilized the
air conditioning cart in both ambient and refrigerated modes. Approximately 11 hours of
ground testing was conducted. The aircraft was temporarily modified for this test and
returned to its pre-test configuration immediately thereafter.
The radar’s inlet cooling fan was removed and a locally manufactured mass
airflow test section was interconnected to the inlet cooling duct and a ground air
conditioning cart. A schematic showing this setup is presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9
AN/APG-68 ASTARS II Cooling Test Setup

COOLING TEST RESULTS
The data clearly showed that the AN/APG-68 radar set required conditioned air to
operate satisfactorily in a MIL-STD-210B, hot day (103 deg F) environment without
thermal shutdown due to excessive exhaust temperatures at the individual LRUs,
particularly the PSP.
Results (Figure A-2) showed that the AN/APG-68 radar set as installed in
USNTPS NP-3D aircraft, could not be operated on the ground for any significant length
of time due to thermal shutdown. The fan configuration for the system was not sized
adequately to provide enough airflow.
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RECOMMENDED FIX
The economical solution was to maintain the current configuration but substitute a
larger capacity fan for the current cooling fan. Also, installation of a cooling duct from
the nose wheel well inlet orifice to the fan would be required to draw only outside air to
the radar set. For ground operations, an air conditioning cart would have to be used on
hot days (OAT >80 deg F) to supply refrigerated air to the wheel well. This refrigerated
air would then be drawn through the nose wheel well bulkhead orifice by the cooling fan
to be delivered to the radar.

COOLING SOLUTION
The team researched different vendors for COTS cooling fans that would meet the
requirements for rated performance, size, weight and cost. While the search effort
continuing, a structural analysis of the mounting location was accomplished, along with
an analysis of the electrical power required. All mounting hardware could be fabricated
in-house and installed locally.
Flight and ground testing of the new cooling fan would be required. Baseline
thermal data of the present configuration as well as thermal data obtained from the new
configuration would be recorded and analyzed to confirm the AN/APG-68 Radar Set
received adequate cooling for all flight and ground operations of the aircraft.
The cooling fan that met the requirements of the ground cooling test was the
Hamilton Sundstrand Fan 4101238E shown in Figure A-4. As a precautionary measure,
the team ordered two fans in order to have a spare readily available. Total cost for the
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fans was $17,440. The fans were ordered in July of 2004 with expected delivery date of
October 25, 2004. Actual delivery date was November 8, 2004.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT METRICS
PERFORMANCE
The ASTARS II aircraft met all the performance capabilities of ASTARS I with
two exceptions. First, to protect the PSP from overheat, the AN/APG-68 radar would be
restricted from operating and transmitting on deck during hot weather conditions. This
limitation would only affect one exercise - the Airborne Systems Radar Evaluation,
which incorporates a ground test event using actual air-to-air targets flying over the
Chesapeake Bay to collect radar performance data. The second limitation would be a
requirement to operate the radar with the FLIR turret extended to increase airflow around
the radar in-flight. Since the FLIR turret has to be retracted in visible moisture, the radar
would have to be off during the same conditions. This limitation would result in no
means to provide air traffic deconfliction in bad weather. ASTARS II would have to rely
solely on air traffic control agencies in Instrument Meteorological Conditions.

COST
AIRCRAFT COSTS
The largest costs for the aircraft were in four areas: structurally modifying the
aircraft for the ASTARS mission systems, completing the required acceptance
maintenance phase, purchasing mission system avionics, and structurally modifying the
aircraft for additional ditching stations. Total costs were approximately $2,170,000 for
the aircraft modifications, which was $130,000 less than initial AoA estimates. Despite
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the program going well beyond the desired schedule timeline, the creation of ASTARS II
came close to meeting budget-estimated goals.

RADAR SYSTEM COSTS
The actual parts costs for the “free” radar were significant. Had the team not been
able to get the old PSP replaced without charge, the total costs for repairing and replacing
parts alone would have been $418,586, sending the overall budget beyond the desired
cap. Since the PSP was replaced without charge, the parts ended up costing $91,200.
Nevertheless countless man-hours were spent in discussion of the problems,
troubleshooting the radar system, traveling to get parts tested, investigating radar issues
and making software adjustments. A list of the LRU replacement costs is shown in Table
10.
Table 10
ASTARS II Radar System Replacement Costs
Part
Waveguide

Part Identification
5985-01-157-8193

PSP Initial

1270-01-231-9800WF

PSP from supply
Antenna Repair

783R240G01
1270-01-212-2950WF

MLPRF Initial
MLPRF From
supply
Cooling fan (2)

1270-01-233-0011WF
1270-01-233-0011WF

Costs
Significance
$9940 Part not included in original
delivery.
$327,395 Massive schedule delay. High
cost jeopardized ASTARS II
program. Final cost was not
incurred due to supply system
workaround.
No cost Schedule delay
$17,746 Would not allow the radar system
to work
$7581 Radar inoperative
$38,493 Radar inoperative, schedule delay

Hamilton Sundstrand
Fan 4101238E

$17,440
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Necessary to meet cooling
requirements

SCHEDULE
The most significant program issue was the schedule delay. The impacts to the
U.S. Naval Test Pilot School, Empire Test Pilot School, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School,
and T& E Short Courses were significant. ASTARS I was in a long downtime
maintenance phase just as ASTARS II was supposed to IOC. Further exacerbating the
problem, the ASTARS I six-month maintenance phase extended by two months. After
ASTARS I completed the phase, it returned to USNTPS, where it subsequently went
down for various maintenance items, keeping it in a non-flying status for the majority of
four months. This resulted in the following:
•

USNTPS did not have an ASTARS aircraft for an entire year.

•

Air Force Test Pilot School training detachments were cancelled.

•

The Empire Test Pilot School detachment was cancelled.

•

No USNTPS Short Course flights were conducted in an ASTARS aircraft.

•

One entire USNTPS class did not have an ASTARS platform to train on and
overall class systems training was significantly degraded. Back-up exercises
were flown in more expensive F/A-18B aircraft.

•

USNTPS training in HMI, radar and integrated system test techniques were
sacrificed.

•

Substitute aircraft had to be found (S-3B, EA-6B, F-16, MH-60K) that cost
more and did not offer the same advantages to test pilot instruction that the
flying laboratory ASTARS environment offered.

In November of 2004, ASTARS II was approaching a fully mission capable
status. All remaining radar issues were well understood and the various radar corrections
and cooling system modifications supported confidence in completing the ASTARS II
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acquisition program. However, the aircraft had now reached a point in its maintenance
schedule that required its return to PDM. By November 22, the aircraft would find itself
in a non-flying status for another six to eight months. It would also be located a great
distance away from the needed engineering and fabrication support organizations. With
the new radar cooling fan install and functional tests remaining, the aircraft would be
unable to support any syllabus items before PDM. Adding this delay to the overall
schedule slide, the aircraft has been unable to support various Test Pilot School schedules
for a total of two years.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
From the start of the ASTARS II Program no clear designation was made as to
who would hold the position of PM. The acquisition team was run in a democratic
fashion. Meetings were called as needed by any member. Assignments were given to
whomever seemed most qualified for the task or to whomever was generally available at
the time. Progress was reported back to the entire group instead of a single PM. Resource
intensive program decisions were made by polling all members for objections.
Key drawbacks occurred with this type of organizational structure. First, there
was no final decision authority when a consensus could not be reached, resulting in
individuals continuing their work without firm direction. A consensus, or lack of
significant objection, resulted in unofficial approval to continue with the course of action
in question. Another disadvantage was that no ASTARS II team member was afforded
the opportunity to take over the program and set aside his or her regular work duties to
manage what was often a full-time job. Individual members did not always know who
would be the signoff authority on clearances, sublevel signoffs, budget expenditures or
schedule changes. Approval for work units went to whoever seemed most appropriate.
Decisions were made on an individual basis as to how a task should be done, who should
be informed and what higher authority would be sought out when needed. Work was
done when time permitted with priority based on each team member’s personal demands.
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In all likelihood, the democratic structure succeeded as well as it did because the
team was able to fall back on their collective acquisition experience.

ACQUISITION STRATEGY DESIGN
An acquisition strategy was never formalized. Not having a defined acquisition
plan resulted in two major disadvantages. First, because the schedule was not formalized,
the team worked to unrealistic deadlines that were too generous. It was assumed that the
impact of any schedule slides for ASTARS II, in terms of restricting its availability for
test pilot school training, could be lessened by getting a waiver to the ASTARS I
maintenance phase schedule. In reality, no waivers for P-3 maintenance phases would be
granted for either ASTARS aircraft. The second drawback was that an acquisition
strategy would have been an excellent way to educate new managers and new program
office personnel on program intent, objectives, considered alternatives, how and why
strategic decisions were made, and the current status of the program. New members had
to learn about the program on-the-job, resulting in a vague understanding of the ASTARS
II acquisition plan and time lost learning about the program through routine exposure.

TEAM ROLE DEFINITIONS
Team members described the team structure as ad hoc. As it was with the
undefined PM position, the lack of team structure and role assignment led to confusion,
vague duties and no clear understanding of the approval process.
An additional limitation introduced by the absence of team role definitions was
that when immediate tasks outside the program required a team member’s attention, the
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ASTARS II program had to wait for those higher priority tasks to be completed before
the member could return to work on ASTARS II.

TECHNICAL RISK IDENTIFICATION
In the majority of instances risks were quickly identified and dealt with, but a
clean sheet engineering analysis of the APG-68 radar was never prepared. The systems
engineering process was informally conducted via email. A dedicated and complete
analysis of the radar’s requirements such as electrical, structural, supportability,
reliability and cooling budgets was not conducted. Specifically, the team failed to
identify a cooling requirement that was double that of the APG-66.
The first step in conducting engineering risk analysis would have been to obtain
all Interface Control Documents for the APG-68. This would have allowed for a full
examination of the wiring, data transfer and software interfaces. Since the ICDs were not
obtained upfront, systems integration and software designers had to go with a best guess
on interface controls with a reliance on the APG-66 knowledge. Since the radar
interfaces were not the same, time was lost correcting integration incompatibilities that
resulted from the APG-66 and APG-68 differences.
Looking past the cooling requirements was also a result of groupthink acceptance.
The common perception was that this generation of radar operated without extensive
cooling because the manufacturer had built numerous “air-cooled” vice liquid or ECS
cooled radars. The APG-68 system was, in fact, designed at the very extreme of what
could be considered air-cooled. Ambient airflow rates and pressure required to keep the
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PSP from overheating were significant. The blind acceptance of the manufacturer’s
reputation for making air-cooled radars and a failure to design sufficient cooling support
resulted in more schedule delays.

ACQUISITION PROCESS ITERATION
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook states that strategy modifications during
program execution should be iterated if:
1. The strategy is not succeeding;
2. Requirements and/or environmental factors have changed or new ones have
been introduced; or
3. New risks have been identified.

The ASTARS II team had an ad hoc strategy that was not succeeding as new risks
were identified, yet the iterative review process was not applied. Modifications to the
acquisition process in a structured and disciplined manner offered assurance that the
acquisition strategy could be adjusted in an explicit, logical, connected and coherent
manner. Schedule slides and costs incurred from the unstructured acquisition process
could have been eliminated with a program review and restructuring.

OPTIONS AND MARKET RESEARCH
Although an APG-66 radar could not be found at the start of the ASTARS II
program, it may have been possible to find one later. As soon as the APG-68 was
proposed, no additional time was spent in trying to locate another APG-66. If finding an
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APG-66 had remained a priority and one had been found, all of the radar system issues
particular to the ASTARS II program could have been avoided.

COMPETITION
Commercial competition was not considered. Lack of a formal program budget
resulted in not having the option to solicit commercial bids because the team did not have
a pool of funds that could be committed to pay contractors. Instead, work was paid for
incrementally and budgets were reviewed quarterly during the program’s execution. The
team never solicited private industry to determine if they could develop an acceptable
product within reasonable cost, schedule and performance constraints.

ACQUISITION MILESTONES, REVIEWS, AND DOCUMENTATION
Formal acquisition milestones and reviews were not established and no official
documentation was maintained. Without the milestones and reviews, the normal methods
of refining the program and making periodic adjustments did not occur, resulting in an
inefficient task completion process that did not improve over the duration of the program.
Without normal risk tracking and documentation, the standard way of identifying
risks, formulating mitigation plans and conducting periodic reviews did not occur. The
team had no formal process to identify when a mitigation path had reached the breaking
point and a new course would be needed. Example problems that took place due to the
lack of documentation included the failure to track and review flight clearances, which
delayed clearance approval, and a requirement to justify aircraft 148889 ownership when
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the Fleet was looking for training aircraft. Had documentation been formally maintained,
the countless man-hours required to prepare justification documents for keeping the
aircraft in USNTPS possession would have been avoided.
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CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS

CLEARLY IDENTIFY PROGRAM NEEDS
The Program Manager should work closely with the user to validate the need and
make certain it is well understood by the program stakeholders. As part of identifying the
program needs, the PM should ensure that market research and analysis is conducted to
determine the availability and suitability of existing commercial and non-developmental
items prior to starting developmental acquisition.

APPOINT A PROGRAM MANAGER
All acquisition programs need a formally recognized manager. Programs require
a lead to channel information to higher authority inside and outside of the program’s
reporting chain. Outside organizations and the chain of command also want a single
contact that represents the acquisition team for all aspects of development
communication. Furthermore, the integrated program team will benefit from having a
single point of contact for approval and decision-making responsibilities.
The Program Manager is responsible for insuring that an acquisition strategy is
developed and updated. Without a PM, no one is accountable for writing the acquisition
strategy. The Program Manager has the overall responsibility for meeting user-defined
Key Performance Parameters while staying accountable for contracting, funding, cost,
test and evaluation, software, logistics support, production, technology and risk
management.
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Finally, the assigned Program Manager has to be given sufficient resources to stay
abreast of the program developments and risks. Time is a resource. The manager cannot
have so many collateral duties that he or she is unable to monitor all aspects of the
program real-time or is unavailable when time critical decisions have to be made.

FORMALLY DEFINE THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The PM should select and develop the acquisition strategy and keep it current by
updating it whenever the system acquisition approach requires further definition,
correction or modification. As a minimum, the strategy should be updated for each
program milestone review. Since change is common in DoD acquisition - specifically in
terms of threat assessment, business processes, product advances and funding stability - a
continuing review of acquisition strategy must be the normal practice as a change
management tool and risk mitigator.
The acquisition strategy is the formal record of all strategic choices and changes
made in response to an evolving threat, technology, business process and other
environmental factors. As such, it is best to formally document the strategy, to educate
new program managers and new program office personnel regarding program intent,
objectives, considered alternatives, how and why strategic decisions were made and
monitor the current status of program. It should be the baseline for evaluating program
effectiveness as well as for determining any requirements for changes to the existing
strategy. As the Acquisition Strategy Guidebook states, the acquisition strategy serves
as:
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•

A checklist to ensure that all important issues and alternatives are
considered

•

A decision aid in prioritizing and integrating functional requirements,
evaluating and selecting alternatives, identifying decision points and
providing a coordinated approach

•

A basis for preparing program plans and activities

•

Documentation of the ground rules of assumptions on which the
program was based

•

The vehicle for building and achieving consensus

•

The formal record of all strategic changes made in response to
evolving threat, technology and environmental factors.

A sound acquisition strategy could have eliminated the majority of the ASTARS
II programmatic woes. If the strategy is properly system engineered, the PM can utilize it
to defend the program, build support and stay abreast of change.

START WITH A CLEAN SHEET ENGINEERING REVIEW
Risk management publications like the DoD 4245.7-M provide clear guidance on
assessing the risk of technology. Guides such as this should be used to make a clean
sheet analysis of risks. From an aviation systems management perspective, these guides
provide a framework for conducting a fresh top-to-bottom review.
In the case of ASTARS II, the guide’s “Critical Risk Attribute Matrix” would
have the team define all physical, performance, cost, and process attributes. Under the
“performance/physical” category alone, the evaluator is reminded to review power,
weight, survivability, size, heat dissipation, interface commonality, bandwidth, reliability,
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maintainability, receiver range, transmitter range, human-machine interface, etc.
Brainstorming and group discussions should not be left out, but the various analysis tools
that are readily available should be employed.

FINISH THE PROGRAM
The ASTARS II program is close to being complete. A fully mission capable
aircraft should be available in a short time with a relatively minor effort and relatively
small costs. There is great confidence among those familiar with ASTARS II that the
issues remaining have sensible and feasible solutions. Radar functional issues that
remain will be resolved. Only minor modifications will be required for the remaining
non-radar related anomalies.
The cooling air problem has been thoroughly studied. A logical solution is ready
for implementation and testing. The cost of completing the radar cooling fixes and the
time involved in doing so will also be small. Getting the radar working as designed will
merely require installing and testing the new fan configuration in the operational flight
environment. Data reduction and reporting will add to the final costs, but these costs will
be inconsequential. The team in place can get the job done. With their understanding of
the system, they are the best solution to getting the aircraft operational as quickly as
possible.
The additional ASTARS aircraft will significantly enhance test pilot training
capabilities. Thousands of students from across the globe will benefit from this
additional asset. ASTARS II should be fielded at the earliest opportunity.
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Dual Mode Transmitter

Antenna

Programmable
Signal Processor

Modular
Low Power RF

Antenna

Figure A-1
AN/APG-68 Radar Configuration
(Source: AN/APG-68 User’s Guide)
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Exhaust Fan
(not visible)
Cooling Duct (removed)

Exhaust Duct to
Nose Wheel Well

Inlet Cooling Fan

IRDS Pod (retracted)

Figure A-2
AN/APG-68 Installation
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Figure A-3
AN/APG-68 Ground Cooling Test Results
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14:24:00

14:31:12

Figure A-4
Hamilton Sundstrand Fan 4101238E
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Vita
Lieutenant Commander Denis G. Tri is a native of St. Paul, MN and graduated
from Iowa State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical
Engineering. He entered the Naval Service in 1991 and reported to Naval Flight Officer
Training in Pensacola, FL.
LCDR Tri was selected to fly F-14 aircraft and reported to VF-124 in Miramar,
CA for advanced training in the Tomcat. In 1994, after graduating first in his class, he
reported to the VF-111 Sundowners on deployment in the Yellow Sea, in support of
Korean Contingency Operations. Upon disestablishment of VF-111, LCDR Tri reported
to the VF-211 Fighting Checkmates and made two more deployments in support of
Operations Southern Watch and the Taiwan/China Missile Crisis. Prior to his third
deployment, LCDR Tri was selected to attend the USMC Weapons and Tactics Instructor
course at MAWTS-1, Yuma, AZ. His first tour was highlighted by early designation as a
Mission Commander and being the first in the F-14 fleet to complete the Strike Fighter
Weapons and Tactics program.
Ashore, LCDR Tri was selected to the United States Naval Test Pilot School as
part of Class 114, where he graduated with Distinction in 1999. LCDR Tri reported to
Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23, Patuxent River, MD as the project officer for
numerous F-14 and F/A-18E/F programs including F-14 DFCS envelope expansion, the
first Joint Tactical Combat Training System flight and the first F-14 refueling from the
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. LCDR Tri was also selected for the immediate response test
team in charge of getting the F/A-18 Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance
System to the Kosovo conflict.
In 2001, LCDR Tri reported to the Carrier Air Wing Two staff and completed a
fourth operational deployment in support of Operation Southern Watch and counter
terrorism operations. Selected to the Acquisition Community in 2002, he reported to the
United States Naval Test Pilot School as a Flight Instructor, responsible for training fleet
aviators, naval flight officers, and engineers, as well as Army, Air Force and international
students. In April 2004, he became the Airborne Systems Curriculum Department Head,
in charge of all airborne systems test and evaluation training for USNTPS. In November
of 2004 he was selected as Aide to the Commander of Naval Air Systems Command.
LCDR Tri has accumulated over 1,800 flight hours in 36 different aircraft and has
logged over 350 carrier landings. His decorations include the Strike/Flight Air Medal,
Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, and various other awards.
LCDR Tri resides in Solomons, MD.
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